5. The techniques of interrogation
6. Can torture ever be justified?
8. Secrecy and public relations
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5. The techniques of interrogation
The Geneva Conventions protecting POWs and civilians in times of occupation broadly prohibit torture and other inhumane treatment, but also specifically bar coercive interrogations -- the use of inhumane treatment in an attempt to extract information. Published U.S. Army intelligence doctrine and detainee regulations acknowledge those requirements, as they must.Steven C. Welsh, "Iraq Prisoner Abuse and the Geneva Conventions," The Defense Monitor, Newsletter of the Center for Defense Information, May/June 2004
From the U.S. Army Training Manual
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind . . . The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
Department of the Army, FM 34-52, Appendix J, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, Article 17, QUESTIONING OF PRISONERS, May 8, 1987
The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources. . . . The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source.
Department of the Army, FM 34-52, Chapter 1. INTERROGATION AND THE INTERROGATOR. Principles of Interrogation: Prohibition against use of force, May 8, 1987
Some interrogation techniques, now . . . and then
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From: U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 34-52, Appendix H: Approaches, May 8, 1987 |
From: Henry Charles Lea, A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, 1887 |
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The FUTILITY TECHNIQUE APPROACH is used to make the source believe that it is useless to resist and to persuade him to cooperate with the interrogator. The futility approach is most effective when the interrogator can play on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. . . . There is the futility of . . . "you are not finished here until you answer the questions," futility in that "everyone talks sooner or later." |
The prisoner was shown the implements of torment and urged to confess. On his refusal he was stripped and bound . . . and again entreated to speak. . . . This frequently produced the desired result . . . the efficacy of torture lay not so much in what was extracted by its use as in the innumerable cases in which its dread, near or remote, paralyzed the resolution with agonizing expectations. |
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The "WE KNOW ALL" APPROACH convinces the source that we already know everything. . . . When the source begins to give accurate and complete information to the questions to which the interrogator has the answers, the interrogator begins interjecting questions for which he does not have the answers. |
The inquisitor was to pretend that he had conclusive evidence, and that if the accused would confess and point out those who had led him astray, he should be allowed to go home forthwith. |
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The FILE AND DOSSIER APPROACH is when the interrogator prepares a dossier containing all available information . . . . Careful arrangement of the material . . . may give the illusion that it contains more data than what is actually there. . . . The interrogator may read a few selected bits of known data to further impress the source. . . . The success of this technique is largely dependent on the naivete of the source, the volume of data . . . and the skill of the interrogator in convincing the source. |
The inquisitor is advised during the examination to turn over the pages of evidence as though referring to it, and then boldly inform the prisoner that he is not telling the truth, for it is thus and thus; or to pick up a paper and pretend to read from it whatever is necessary to deceive him. |
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The DECREASED FEAR DOWN APPROACH . . . is really nothing more than calming the source and convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated. . . . When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rapport and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. . . . as the source will readily respond to kindness. |
To render these devices more effective, the jailer was instructed to worm himself into the confidence of the prisoners, with feigned interest and compassion, and urge them to confess at once, because the inquisitor is a merciful man who will take pity on them. |
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The "MUTT AND JEFF" ("FRIEND AND FOE") APPROACH involves a psychological ploy . . . [in which] two experienced interrogators who are convincing actors . . . display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source. . . . The first interrogator . . . displays an unsympathetic attitude. . . . At the time the source acts hopeless . . . the second interrogator appears . . . to show a sympathetic attitude . . . in an effort to increase the rapport and control the questioning. . . . When used against the proper source, this trick will normally gain . . complete cooperation. |
A more elaborate trap was that of [the jailer] treating the prisoner with kindness in place of rigor . . . to gain his confidence, and then urge him to confess, with promises of mercy. . . . When everything was ripe, the inquisitor himself would appear and confirm these promises, with the mental reservation that all which is done for the conversion of heretics is merciful . . . so that when the unlucky wretch was prevailed upon to ask for mercy in return for his revelations, he was to be led on with the general expression that more would be done for him than he asked. |
In practice
Even the existence of a series of international conventions and a substantial literature and diplomatic agreement about the rights of prisoners, seems not to have prevented an autonomous military from developing its own rules.
Edward Peters, Torture, 1985
Intelligence . . . is a vital commodity and the attempt to get it or withhold it explains much of the terror and torture inflicted by both sides.
William Tuohy, "A Big 'Dirty Little War'," NY Times Magazine, 11/28/1965
Pentagon officials said the rules for interrogation in Iraq had been drastically tightened -- while still insisting the now banned techniques had never been approved for use. . . . Human rights groups have predicted that the Administration might come to rue the extremes to which it pushed the envelope on interrogation.
Johanna McGeary et al., "Pointing Fingers," Time Magazine, 5/24/2004
The ever-shifting rules, in which lists of accepted interrogation tactics were widened drastically before being reined in over 17 crucial months, helped foster a climate in which abuse could flourish. . . . Some of the procedures authorized in Iraq had been banned as too harsh months earlier at Guantánamo.
Douglas Jehl et al., "U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back and Forth of Mixed Messages to G.I.'s," NY Times, 6/22/2004
American policies in Abu Ghraib prison . . . were sanctioned . . . by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the overall commander in Iraq, who . . . signed a classified memorandum calling for interrogators at Abu Ghraib to work with military police guards to "manipulate an internee's emotions and weaknesses" and to assume control over the "lighting, heating . . . food, clothing, and shelter" of those they were questioning.
Mark Danner, "The Logic of Torture," The New York Review of Books, 6/24/2004
In a just-revealed notation on a 2002 memo . . . Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld indicated that making terrorism detainees stand for up to four hours was no biggie in the physical stress department. "I stand for 8-10 hours a day," Rummy scrawled. "Why is standing limited to four hours?"
Richard Leiby, "Donald Rumsfeld, A Real Stand-Up Guy," Washington Post, 6/24/2004
Military intelligence soldiers who were recruited for the special projects team shortly after Mr. Hussein's capture said they were no longer required to get . . . approval to use harsh tactics. . . . like . . . using military dogs during interrogations.. . . "Just having the dog in the room worked pretty effectively," said one intelligence analyst.
Andrea Elliott, "Capture of Hussein Aides Spurred U.S. Interrogators," NY Times, 7/3/2004
Lacking clear guidance, soldiers at various jails were apparently confused about the rules. In Iraq, some guards were such sticklers that they demanded paperwork to take away detainees' blankets, while others did not understand that they needed written authorization to intimidate prisoners with dogs.
Douglas Jehl et al., "U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back and Forth of Mixed Messages to G.I.'s," NY Times, 6/22/2004
While the Administration maintained that its rules and practices of interrogation adhered to international standards, a broad spectrum of critics argue that the Pentagon adopted harsh methods that played fast and loose with the law. Even if no one ordered these particular incidents [at Abu Ghraib], critics argue that the abuses can be read as Administration policy carried to extreme.
Johanna McGeary, "Pointing Fingers," Time Magazine, 5/24/2004